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NOTES
ated. Legislatures in other states have taken steps to clarify their
financial responsibility laws following similar decisions. 86 Per-
haps, this would be an appropriate response in Louisiana as well.
Jeff McHugh David
BEYOND FOOD Am Dsnqx:
ADDED PROTECTION FOR THE INJURED CONSUMER?
Suit was brought on behalf of two minors by their father
against the defendant insurer and its insured claiming damages
for the death of cattle sprayed with defendant's arsenic-based
product. The dip had been allegedly administered in substantial
compliance with published directions. The trial court allowed
recovery. The appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiff
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
spray was properly mixed by plaintiffs and, further, that the
plaintiff offered no proof of negligence on the manufacturer's
part. In reversing the appellate court's decision, the supreme
court held, that the mixture was proper and that no proof of
particular negligence was necessary. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty
Insurance Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971).
At common law, three modes of recovery have been granted
to the injured consumer. The first is under a contractual war-
ranty of "merchantable quality," or fitness for intended purpose.
If this warranty is not express, it is considered to be implied in
the sale or delivery of all products. Recovery in warranty, how-
ever, is encumbered by the availability to the manufacturer of
the defenses surrounding the law of contracts: no reliance,
privity, notice, and disclaimer. Since a great deal of contract
law precludes recovery under warranty, common law jurisdic-
tions have resorted to many fictions in order to circumvent
established rules.1 Moreover, beginning with the decision of the
New Jersey court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,2
which did away with the privity requirement in warranty re-
36. At least two state legislatures have passed laws specifically prohibit-
ing "stacking" after courts had reached decisions similar to Deane and
Graham, see CAUF. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1955); IOWA CODE ANNO. § 516A.2
(1946).
1. This history of warranty is thoroughly discussed in Prosser, Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
2. 32 N.J. 568, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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covery, many courts have abrogated the contractual requisites
surrounding a manufacturer's liability for its products. This
has led at least one eminent authority to suggest that in due time,
through this abrogation, strict liability with regard to manu-
facturers might have come in warranty.8
A second traditional mode of recovery, an action in negli-
gence, requires proof of fault or lack of reasonable care on the
part of the defendant. The difficulty in maintaining and succeed-
ing in this manner is evident when one considers the ordinary
consumer's lack of knowledge of modern day manufacturing pro-
cesses and the customary distance which products must travel
from the manufacturing location to the marketplace. The prob-
lem has been well summarized by Chief Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court: "An injured person, however, is not
ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence or identify the
cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the manu-
facturing process as the manufacturer himself is."'4 While courts
have permitted liberal use of res ipsa loquitur and negligence
per se to aid the consumer, the tort cause of action necessarily
puts the plaintiff-consumer at a disadvantage difficult to over-
come.
Unsatisfied with both the theoretical shortcomings of war-
ranty and the practical results of negligence-based actions,
common law courts have created a sound and equitable action
for the consumer-strict liability for manufactured goods which,
due to some defect, cause injury to the consuming public. The
case which established the doctrine of strict liability in tort,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., contains the following
statement by Justice Traynor: "A manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being."
With the imposition of strict liability, the plaintiff need no
longer establish negligence on the manufacturer's part, and, since
3. Prosser, The Pall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966): "Whether, given enough time-say another
decade-the sales law of warranties might have worked out a method of
dealing effectively with these problems [i.e., contractual rules surrounding
warranty] . . . must always be a matter of speculation."
4. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (concurring opinion).
5. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
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it is an action in tort, the law of contractual warranties is in-
applicable. The essential elements of a plaintiff's case are the
defendant's relationship with the product in question, a defective
or unreasonably dangerous condition of the product, and a causal
relationship between the defect and the plaintiff's injury." Show-
ing the existence of a defect is the primary burden of the
plaintiff, and no set definition of what constitutes a defect has
been accepted. Justice Traynor has suggested that "no single
definition of defect has proved adequate to define the scope
of the manufacturer's strict liability in tort for physical
injuries . . . ."7 An examination of the major cases establishing
strict liability provides the general definition that a defect exists
when a product is unsafe for its intended purpose.8 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a defective product as
one which is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."9
Although no universally accepted definition exists, the pre-
ceding examples illustrate the breadth and scope of a manu-
facturer's liability. At present, strict tort liability, in its various
forms, is the primary mode of recovery available for modern
consumers injured due to a defect in a manufacturer's product.
A recent federal court decision concludes that Louisiana law
provides a recovery for the consumer in strict tort liability.10
With deference, the writer submits that no Louisiana court
has arrived at this conclusion.
In assessing the impact of Weber, it is necessary to review
Louisiana law concerning a manufacturer's liability for defec-
tive products. Recovery of damages from manufacturer-vendors
by purchasers of defective foodstuffs has been available in Lou-
isiana since 1911.11 The liability imposed requires proof that
the food or drink in question was unwholesome and that, due
to this quality, the plaintiff suffered injury. If the plaintiff can
establish these two propositions, a prima facie case has been
6. Id. For further consideration, see Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1066 (1967),
which contains an excellent digest of the current cases and jurisprudential
rules surrounding strict liability in 'every state.
7. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1965).
8. 2 L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILrY § 16A(4e) (Cum. Supp.
1968).
9. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment g (1965).
10. Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969).
11. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kramer Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911).
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created against the defendant,12 and the courts hold him liable
under an implied warranty of wholesomeness of food and drink.'8
To extend plaintiff's recovery for this breach of warranty beyond
rescission of the sale and return of the purchase price, Lou-
isiana courts impute knowledge of the unwholesomeness to
defendant.14 A second line of decisions, beginning with the hold-
ing in Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co.,15 extends
this liability beyond the vendor-vendee relationship.16 Thus, lia-
bility without any proof of negligence exists in Louisiana for
makers of food and drink products under a theory of implied
warranty, and the contractual rules surrounding this warranty
have been substantially abrogated.17 A federal court case sug-
gests that this liability also applies to products designed for
"intimate bodily use."'5
Beyond foodstuffs, the decisions in Louisiana cases prior
to Weber have centered around proof of a defect. Some cases
12. Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 923, 60
So.2d 873, 874 (1952).
13. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kramer Ltd., 129 La. 838, 846, 56 So. 906, 909 (1911).
After quoting the authorities relied upon, the court states: "It will be noted
from the foregoing that the vendor of food to be consumed by the purchaser
is conclusively presumed to know the condition of the food he sells, and
to represent to the purchaser that such food is wholesome. In other words,
the representation which he is thus presumed to make to the purchaser is
not merely that he has been careful in the selection, preparation, and preser-
vation of the food, but that the food is, as a matter of fact, wholesome.
When, therefore, the food proves to be unwholesome the warranty is
breached, and he Is responsible."
14. LA. CIv. CoDs art. 2531, the basic damage article for breach of war-
ranty, provides: "The seller who knew not the vices of the thing, is only
bound to restore the price . . . ." However, article 2545, which was amended
in 1968, extends this responsibility in cases where "[tihe seller, who knows
the vice of the thing he seels and omits to declare it, because the restitution
of price and repayment of the expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages." A comparison of these two
articles makes clear the judiciary's motive for imputing knowledge of de-
fective food and drink to the manufacturer-vendor: Recovery of the pur-
chase price by a plaintiff injured by unwholesome foodstuffs would rarely
be adequate or just compensation for damages suffered. For cases which
broaden the definition of manufacturer-vendor's liability, see Radelac v.
Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So.2d 830 (1955); Tuminello v.
Mawby, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 666 (1952); Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199
So.2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
15. 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952).
16. Id. at 926 n.3, 60 So.2d at 875 n.3: "In 22 Am.Jur. 'Food' § 105, it is
stated that, according to the weight of authority, the basis of liability of
the manufacturer is negligence but it is recognized therein that there are
respectable and strong opinions grounding the liability upon an implied
warranty of wholesomeness of the product, notwithstanding the absence of
any privity of contract. This, we think, Is the better view .... "
17. McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., 202 So.2d 492 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1967).
18. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
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cite the following principle, which has its origin in the common
law:
"A manufacturer or seller of a product which involves a
risk of injury to the user is liable to any person, whether
purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his part
sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design or manu-
facture of the article, if the injury might have been rea-
sonably anticipated."1 9
Notwithstanding the apparent adoption of this principle, proof
of negligence has still been required as a prerequisite to recovery.
In the major Louisiana products liability cases beyond food and
drink, plaintiffs have succeeded only when the existence of a
defect which indicated negligence on the manufacturer's part
could be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
in Arnold v. United States Rubber Co.,20 the plaintiff was held
not to have established the existence of a defect because of his
failure to use the product as intended, and in Meche v. Farmers
Drier & Storage Co.,2' the court held that the manufacturer
could show intervening negligence on the part of the defendant.
An appellate court, summarizing the plaintiff's burden of proof,
has stated that "in order to show negligence it was necessary
for the plaintiff to introduce testimony that the weld in ques-
tion was defective .... ,,22
The most comprehensive review of warranty and tort liabil-
ity by a Louisiana court is found in Penn v. Inferno Manufac-
turing Corp.,23 where the principles relied upon to create liabil-
ity in Weber were foreshadowed.2 4 Although the basis of liability
19. Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So.2d 807, 811 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967). See also Solieau v. Niklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D.
La. 1969); Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1969);
Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 255 La. 598, 232 So.2d 285 (1970); Stelly v.
Quick Mfg. Co., 246 So.2d 302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Thomas v. Gillette
Co., 230 So.2d 870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Foy v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 220 So.2d
229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Arnold v. United States Rubber Co., 203 So.2d
764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
20. 203 So.2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), ceirt. denied, 251 La. 739, 206
So.2d 91 (1968).
21. 193 So.2d 807 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
22. Samaha v. Southern Rambler Sales, Inc., 146 So.2d 29, 30 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
23. 199 So.2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 251 La. 27, 202 So.2d
649 (1967).
24. Id. at 240. The court, after quoting the language from DoyZe pre-
suming knowledge by a manufacturer of vices or defects in his product,
reemphasizes the duty of a manufacturer to the consumer in making a
19721
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required by the court in Penn is unclear, the decision is note-
worthy because of its exposition of the burden of proof neces-
sary in cases of this nature. Under the facts of the case, a
"siteglass" exploded while being operated under normal condi-
tions and within warranted pressure, seriously injuring a gauge
inspector. The injured plaintiff, unable to take advantage of
any presumption of negligence arising from the facts of the
explosion, had to produce tangible evidence of the manufacturer's
negligence which had resulted in the defect. If the doctrine
of strict liability had been applied, the plaintiff would have been
relieved from proving particular negligence once the defect was
shown by proving the product was not fit for its intended pur-
pose. Thus, it can be seen that the key problem with recovery
in tort for defective products, other than foodstuffs, has been
the burden of proving negligence, which the plaintiff must sus-
tain and which he is at a distinct disadvantage to prove.
It is the writer's opinion that the court in Weber changes
that burden.25 The majority opinion utilizes two legal principles
of Louisiana law to effect this change. First, after reiterating
the standard tort duty owed by a manufacturer, Justice Tate
adds: "However, the plaintiff claiming injury has the burden
of proving that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably
dangerous to normal use, and that the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by reason of the defect."2 As shown by later language
in the case, this new definition closely correlates the plaintiff's
burden in this non-food case with that required in cases involv-
product, relying on the same common law source the court in Meohe did to
articulate this duty. The court then concludes that the manufacturer knew
but failed to warn of these defects, and was negligent in failing to do so.
25. The product involved in this case was 15 percent arsenic, and the
brevity of the decision makes it impossible to ascertain the role played by
such a dangerous product in the court's decision. Although the language
of the case seems to encompass any product "which involves a risk of
injury," the inherent danger and high risk of injury which accompany
certain products may move judges toward less stringent standards of proof
as an unspoken matter of policy. To conclude this from Weber would be
inaccurate, for the decision seems to be unconcerned with the type of
product involved; but attention should be called to this possible limitation
of the case. For an appellate court's handling of a harmless household
product before Weber, see Thomas v. Gillette Co., 230 So.2d 870 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970).




ing food.2 Evidently, the court is willing to conclude that a
defect exists if the product, used in its intended manner, causes
harm and if the manufacturer can produce no evidence to rebut
this conclusion beyond the precautionary measures taken in the
manufacturing process.25 Such a broad definition of defect estab-
lishes a reasonable burden of proof more within the plaintiff's
capabilities and places the responsibility on the manufacturer
to refute the prima facie case of liability. Moreover, Weber
allows more latitude in the type of evidence which proves the
existence of a defect by permitting circumstantial evidence to
establish proof by a preponderance.
The second legal principle used by the majority has been
the basis for recovery of damages under implied warranty
since 1911, namely, that "the plaintiff need not prove any partic-
ular negligence by the maker in its manufacture or processing;
for the manufacturer is presumed to know of the vices in the
things he makes, whether or not he has actual knowledge of
them. '29 In warranty, this imputation of knowledge is necessary
to establish liability on the part of the manufacturer for dam-
ages beyond a return of the purchase price.8° Use of this prin-
ciple raises the question of whether the recovery granted by
27. After accepting the trial court's determination that plaintiffs mixed
the dip properly, the court adds: "[T]he plaintiff has made out at least
a prima facie case that the cause of the cattle's death and of his boys'
sickness was excessive arsenic in the batch of the manufacturer's dip pur-
chased by -them: For, if the plaintiff's sons had prepared the spraying-
solution in the manner described, the cattle would not have died from such
normal spraying, if the dip had contained only the normal amount of
arsenic. Id, at 608, 250 So.2d at 755.
28. Another factual aspect of this case which could limit the result is
the testimony elicited from the defendant's veterinary director. The batch
of defendant's product in question was mixed in 1963 and records concerning
various batches were only kept for three years. Since the director had been
in the defendant's employ (1965), he could recall no other complaints or any
record of inadequacy in the 1963 batch, but there was no evidence to prove
this. It seems to this writer that had the defendant been able to establish
by documented records that plaintiff's mishap was the sole complaint from
a 2700 gallon batch, this factor would have greatly enforced the defendant's
allegation that the cattle dip was improperly mixed and, perhaps, forced a
different conclusion from the court.
29. Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 603, 250 So.2d 754, 756
(1971). The language of Doyle v. Purest & Kramer [129 La. 838, 56 So. 906,
1911)], which first imputed knowledge to a manufacturer of a defective
product, provides: "The principle which governs in this case is that every
one ought to know the qualities, good or bad, of the things which he
fabricates . . . , and that lack of such knowledge is imputed to him as a
fault, which makes him liable to the purchasers of his fabrications for the
damage .... " Id. at 843, 56 So. at 907.
30. See note 14 supra.
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the court lies in warranty, tort, or in a subtle blend of both.
A certain answer must await decisions and opinions subsequent
to Weber, as the court does not make this entirely clear. This
writer submits that the recovery is in tort, not warranty, and
therein lies the ultimate value of Weber in Louisiana jurispru-
dence. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Justice
Tate begins the case with a reiteration of the principle which
has provided a tort cause of action in suits concerning products
other than food and drink since 1963.81 This principle establishes
a duty owed, an integral part of any tort liability, and the
restatement of this duty seems to signal a cause of action in tort.
By imputing to a manufacturer knowledge of a product's defec-
tiveness, the court seems to create fault-as required in articles
2315 and 2316 of the Louisiana Civil Code-on the manufacturer's
part and to remove the plaintiff's burden of proving particular
negligence. This imputation of fault by establishment of fore-
seeable risk seems to serve the ultimate purpose of the majority
opinion. Instead of using the traditional warranty approach,
where liability exists without proof of negligence, the majority
has undertaken to redefine defect in tort phraseology and rely
on imputation of knowledge to eliminate the plaintiff's burden
of proving particular negligence. Such an undertaking is per-
suasive proof of an intent to establish a cause of action in tort.
If subsequent cases should relegate this cause of action to
warranty, this writer submits that it will be the type of war-
ranty action recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
which, after endorsing strict liability of a manufacturer in tort,
states:
"There is nothing in this section which would prevent any
court from treating the rule stated as a matter of 'warranty'
to the user or consumer. But if this is done, it should be
recognized and understood that the 'warranty' is a very
different kind of warranty from those usually found in the
sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various con-
tract rules which have grown up to surround such sales." 82
Such a warranty, unencumbered by contract rules, has also been
31. Smith .v. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R., 153 So.2d 533 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963).
32. RZSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-04, comment m (1965).
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recognized by noted commentators on the law of products
liability.88
Whatever cause of action is created, the majority has used
recognized and established Louisiana law in a unique manner to
grant recovery in this case. While the two basic principles of
Weber can be found in Penn,34 their usage in the instant case
is blurred by an extensive review of warranty and tort liability
for defective products. Although the singular effect of the former
may be diminished by the presence of the latter, the court's
endorsement in Weber of imputation of knowledge in tort and
its use of defect reveal, in this writer's opinion, an approach
analogous to common law strict liability: plaintiff must prove
the existence of a defect and a causal relationship between that
defect and the injury which he suffers. If the plaintiff can show
compliance with the directions or intended usage, the court
will conclude that a defect existed and will hold the manu-
facturer liable absent proof to the contrary.8 5 Through this rede-
fining of a defective product as one which is unsafe for its
intended purpose (its unsafeness being presumed from resulting
harm after following directions), a plaintiff's ability to establish
a prima facie case is immeasurably increased, and the burden
of proof is more equitably allocated. However, the liability
imposed is not absolute liability, and the manufacturer can
refute the inference of a defect, as was done in the Arnold and
Meche cases8 6 Further, once the defect is established-i.e., if the
manufacturer cannot refute the presumption-the plaintiff need
not show negligence, as knowledge of the defect and concomi-
33. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960). After discussing the use of
warranty as a mask of courts' true intentions, Dean Prosser predicts: "There
are not lacking indications that some of the courts are about ready to throw
away the crutch, and to admit what they are really doing, when they say
the warranty is not the one made on the original sale, and does not run with
the goods, but Is a new and independent one made directly to the consumers,
and that it does not arise out of or depend upon any contract, but is imposed
by the law, in tort, as a matter of policy."
See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(4a) (1966):
"If a court does not require, inter alia, privity of contract, a sale, or notice
of a breach of warranty, does it matter that the defendant is being strictly
liable in warranty rather than tort. The answer seems obvious. If a court
imposes strict warranty liability irrespective of contract and sales rules,
then strict liability in warranty and tort are synonymous."
34. See note 24 supra.
35. Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971).
36. For a post-Weber case applying the above analysis, see Clark v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 254 So.2d 62 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1971).
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tant fault will be imputed to the manufacturer. Thus, the
majority in Weber, without relying on the Restatement or men-
tioning strict liability, as suggested by plaintiff's attorney8 suc-
cessfully meshes established Louisiana legal principles to protect
an injured consumer by placing the burden of proof and weight
of presumption against the party best able to bear the burden
and produce information. The ultimate value of Weber will be
determined by hindsight alone, but, this writer submits, if the
cause of action is deemed to sound in tort and the case is applied
widely beyond its facts, the potential protection available to
persons injured by defective products is significantly increased.
Jacque B. Pucheu, Jr.
CAPITAL GAINS ON PROCEEDS OF TImBER SALES
Plaintiff's ancestor operated a naval stores business' on his
land. Subsequent to his death, the land was conveyed to a cor-
poration whose sole shareholders were beneficiaries of the estate
and plaintiffs herein. The corporation terminated the naval
stores business and, after determining that the land's future lay
in the production of trees for sale, implemented a program of
site improvement. 2 A county directory listing the corporation
as a buyer and seller of timber was the only advertising under-
taken. In a single transaction the corporation sold all the tim-
ber growing on its land. The corporation later became a Sub-
chapter S corporation, and plaintiffs filed individual income tax
returns, treating their distributive shares of the taxable year's
payment on the sale price as capital gains.4 The Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service determined that the proceeds
were taxable as ordinary income. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a jury finding upholding that determination.
Huxford v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1971).
The Internal Revenue Code creates a distinction between
37. 259 La. at 628, 250 So.2d at 765.
1. Generally, the term "naval stores" refers to turpentine, tar, pitch,
pine oil, rosin, and other products obtained from the resin of pine and
other cone-bearing trees
2. The trees used in the naval stores business and other inferior trees
were gradually cleared out, young trees planted, new fire-breaks made and
new roads built.
3. INT. Ray. CODS of 1954, § 1371.
4. Id. § 1378.
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